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INTRODUCTION
In this Article, we consider preliminary injunctions from a radically
different perspective than that articulated in judicial opinions and prior legal
scholarship. By conventional accounts, when confronted with uncertain legal
entitlements, courts should consider preliminary awards only if adequate
compensatory remedies are unavailable. The trouble with this "compensatory"
view is that it is unresponsive to the ex ante behavioral consequences of legal
uncertainty. When rights are uncertain, parties appreciate the full benefits of
their conduct, but they discount harm to others of this conduct by the likelihood
that they possess a legal entitlement to so act. Hence, individual incentives to
behave efficiently are distorted by uncertain legal entitlements. Preliminary
injunctions correct this distortion by wielding a stick and providing a carrot for
a defendant who would otherwise discount damages given some positive
probability that she may not have to pay them. The powerful stick in this
example is the in terrorem damages that defendant will be required to pay if an
injunction is granted and she violates it. The carrot is the reimbursement of
compliance costs if defendant prevails at the end of the litigation. These
penalties and rewards come into play only if the plaintiff decides to pursue the
injunction, which is to say that the preliminary injunction doctrine takes the
conduct decision out of the hands of the biased defendant and places it in the
hands of plaintiff who, by design, faces the proper marginal costs and benefits
of the decision. Interestingly, although courts do not claim that they are
promoting efficient behavior when granting preliminary injunctions, that
characterization represents a good account for much of what courts are doing.
Preliminary injunctions are broadly used. Parties seek injunctions to enjoin
patent, copyright, and trademark infringement, 1 corporate mergers, 2 breaches
1. See, e.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (1lth Cir. 2001)
(vacating an order granting a preliminary injunction to the owners of copyright in the novel
Gone with the Wind, which had enjoined the publication and distribution of The Wind Done
Gone); Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of
preliminary injunction in trademark infringement case relating to Ty's Beanie Babies toys);
CNB Fin. Corp. v. CNB Cmty. Bank, No. CIV.A.03-6945(PBT), 2004 WL 2434878 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 30, 2004) (enjoining defendant from trademark infringement); Best Cellars, Inc. v.
Grape Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (enjoining defendants from
trade dress infringement and copyright infringement); Progressive Games, Inc. v. Shuffle
Master, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (D. Nev. 1999) (granting preliminary injunction in
gambling machine patent infringement case).
2. See, e.g., Mony Group, Inc. v. Highfields Capital Mgmt., L.P., 368 F.3d 138 (2d Cir.
2004) (enjoining dissenting shareholders from mailing proxy cards); Bernard v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 873 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1989) (granting injunction to set aside labor
agreement); United States v. UPM-Kymmene Oyj, 2003-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,101 (N.D.
Ill. 2003) (enjoining merger as violative of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2000)); In re
Pure Res., Inc., S'holder Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002) (enjoining exchange offer
pending alteration of terms); Solar Cells, Inc. v. True N. Partners, L.L.C., C.A. No. 19477,
2002 LEXIS 38 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) (enjoining merger).
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of contract, 3 nuisances,
4 marriages, 5 entertainment,
6 and even manner of dress.
7
In fact, almost any activity one can imagine is potentially subject to legal
restraint through preliminary proceedings. 8 However, remarkably little
attention has been paid to whether these proceedings tend to promote or
discourage desirable activities. The neglect of this issue among law and
economics scholars is particularly difficult to explain.9 The doctrine specifying
when a court will grant a preliminary injunction is cast in terms with obvious
economic content. The preliminary injunction is only to be granted if plaintiff
will suffer significant harm and stands to recover inadequate damages if she
prevails at the conclusion of the case. Moreover, the right to a preliminary
injunction depends in large part (under all versions of the controlling rule) on
3. See, e.g., Arch Pers. Care Prods., L.P. v. Malmstrom, 90 Fed. Appx. 17 (3d Cir.
2003) (affirming order enforcing a noncompetition agreement); Northwest Bakery Distribs.,
Inc. v. George Weston Bakeries Distribution, Inc., No. 04-C8233, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
385 (N.D. Il1. Jan. 11, 2005) (allowing injunction to stop termination of bakery distribution
agreement); Hillard v. Guidant Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d 379 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (enjoining
defendant from breaking exclusive sales contract); V.I. Taxi Ass'n v. V.I. Port Auth., 36 V.I.
43 (1997) (enjoining defendants from violating a taxi-franchise agreement).
4. See, e.g., City of S. Pasadena v. Slater, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(enjoining freeway extension); Bragg v. Robertson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 635 (S.D. W. Va. 1999)
(enjoining issuance of mining permits); United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d
1145 (D. Colo. 1998) (directing defendant to comply with state regulations for hazardous-
waste facilities); Maloof v. State Dep't of Env't, 136 Md. App. 682 (Ct. Spec. App. 2001)
(affirming circuit court's issuance of preliminary injunction enjoining operation of landfill).
5. See, e.g., Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court, 317 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Mass. 2004).
6. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003)
(enjoining use of video clips); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342
F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003) (enjoining use of movie clip previews on the Internet); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (challenging sharing and
copying of music MP3 files); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60 (2d
Cir. 1996) (enjoining copyright infringement by karaoke company); EMI Latin v. Bautista,
No. 03 Civ. 0947 (WHP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2612 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2003) (enjoining
defendant from interfering with plaintiff's rights to manufacture and distribute music album).
7. See, e.g., Newsom v. Albemarle County Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2003)
(using injunction to prevent the enforcement of a high school dress code); Luckette v. Lewis,
883 F. Supp. 471 (D. Ariz. 1995) (seeking preliminary injunction against a prison policy that
prohibited the plaintiff from wearing colors thought to be associated with particular gangs).
8. Preliminary injunctions have recently been sought in other areas, including
preventing executions. In Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999), Germany sought a
preliminary injunction to prevent the scheduled execution of one of its citizens in Arizona.
See also Ozmint v. Hill, 541 U.S. 929 (2004) (granting application to vacate preliminary
injunction of execution). Preliminary injunctions have also been used to prevent religious
celebrations, Chabad of S. Ohio v. City of Cincinnati, 363 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2004), and to
challenge courthouse and classroom postings of the Ten Commandments. ACLU of Ky. v.
McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), aff'd, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
9. There have been some efficiency considerations of preliminary injunctions in the
context of intellectual property cases, but these works have not explored the efficiency of the
standard per se. See, e.g., Jean 0. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of
Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. & EcON. 573 (2001); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998).
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the probability that plaintiff will prevail if the case is litigated to a conclusion.
These requirements seem, unmistakably, to represent an attempt to adapt
efficiently to the uncertainty of the final outcome. In commonsense terms, there
is a prevailing awareness that the requisite tasks to achieve the objectives of the
controlling legal rule cannot be deferred until the conclusion of the litigation.
Preliminary injunction doctrine recognizes that the task of protecting legal
entitlements cannot be postponed until the conclusion of the litigation
concerning the assignment of those entitlements. This fact is at odds with the
usual law and economics understanding that the assignment and protection of
entitlements can be separated and handled sequentially so long as damages at
the conclusion of the case are adequate.' 0 Accordingly, proponents of the
current preliminary injunction doctrine cite the oft-mentioned claim that
adequate damages at the conclusion of the case make the entitlement holder
whole while encouraging efficient allocation of resources. The most prominent
expression of this claim is the so-called "efficient breach hypothesis.'' This
10. Building on Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed's framework for analyzing
how legal entitlements are assigned and protected, scholars often look at entitlement protection
in isolation from the assignment of rights. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089
(1972). Theories of efficient liability rules begin with certainty over some initial entitlement: The
court has already determined to whom the entitlement belongs (or the parties know how the
court will rule). The parties also know the remedies. Armed with this information, efficient
tradeoffs can be made. Unfortunately, parties frequently do not know to whom the court will
grant an entitlement. Preliminary injunctive actions make this indeterminacy quite apparent; yet,
the indeterminacy is present in numerous other contexts.
11. The efficient breach hypothesis has its origins in seventeenth-century British
common law. See Bromage v. Genning, (1616) 81 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B.). Oliver Wendell
Holmes cites Lord Coke in Bromage for support of the fundamental premise of the efficient
breach hypothesis: "The duty to keep a contract at common law means ... you must pay
damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). Departing from this premise, the Holmesian "bad
man"-knowing the costs and the benefits of contract completion-is in a good position to
determine the efficient remedy. It appears that the term "efficient breach" may have been
coined, at least in print, by Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott. See Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some
Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554
(1977). Earlier formal treatments of the efficient breach hypothesis were offered by Robert
Birmingham, John Barton, and Richard Posner. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.8 (1972); John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for
Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of
Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970);
Robert L. Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry of
Contract Law, 1969 DuKE L.J. 49. Calabresi and Melamed generalized the insight beyond
contracts using liability rules, and this work was expanded and further formalized by Louis
Kaplow and Steven Shavell. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10; Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 725 (1996) (arguing that liability rules (with appropriate court-determined
damages) allow infringers, who know whether their own valuations exceed the court's
damages, to make an allocationally efficient choice from their more informed perspective).
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hypothesis maintains that court-ordered expectation damages (a liability rule)
lead parties to maintain or abandon prior agreements efficiently. Although this
argument was initially focused on contracts, similar efficiency-based arguments
have also been made to promote the use of liability rules within the context of
tort, property, corporate, and constitutional law. 
12
The basic idea is that if a party is required to compensate anyone harmed
by particular conduct, the party, in deciding whether, and with what frequency,
to engage in the conduct, will internalize the costs imposed on others and
engage in the conduct only to the point at which the benefits of doing so exceed
the aggregate costs. Liability rules encourage parties to weigh the costs of
avoiding liability-through performance (e.g., completing a contract) or
nonperformance (e.g., not causing a nuisance or otherwise interfering with
another's entitlement)-against the costs of facing liability (e.g., breaching the
contract and paying the damage remedy or causing a nuisance and paying
compensation). Thus, when properly employed, the liability rule remedy, we
are constantly reminded, maximizes social welfare. The starting point of our
analysis is that such efficiency claims often are wrong.
When the assignment of entitlements (and, hence, liability for interference
with entitlements) is uncertain, parties rationally discount harms when selecting
their course of conduct. Uncertainty biases the estimates that are required under
the efficient breach and other efficient "takings" hypotheses. This kind of
uncertainty is virtually always present in preliminary proceedings. Yet leading
commentators see "no occasion to grant immediate protection" when a "final
judgment can remedy the plaintiffs injuries." 13 We show, however, that the
availability of an adequate final remedy is not a sufficient justification for
denying preliminary injunctions: adequate compensation at the conclusion of
the case does not provide parties with sufficient incentive to engage in efficient
conduct before and during the case. 14 This point has been obscured by the static
Thus, liability rules are able to harness the private information held by the relatively more
informed infringers. But cf. Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, A Critique of "Tangibility" as
the Basis of Probability Rules (Yale Law School, Program for Studies in Law, Economics,
and Public Policy, Working Paper No. 251, 2002).
12. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional
Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REV. 961, 1008 (1998) (arguing that liability rules can protect
constitutional rights more effectively than property rules in some cases); Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 10; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 11; Eugene Konotorovich, Liability
Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755 (2004).
But cf. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES
115 (1997); Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95
YALE L.J. 1335, 1339-40 (1996).
13. John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525,
541 (1978). Even efficiency-minded judges have echoed this view. See Am. Hosp. Supply
Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., 780 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1986).
14. Commentators have emphasized the incommensurability of damages for certain
temporary losses of entitlements: "The right to speak or vote or worship after trial does not
replace the right to speak or vote or worship pending trial, and damages for temporary loss
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treatment of preliminary injunctions in the existing academic literature.
15
However, it is clear that the preliminary injunctive proceeding is a dynamic
process-a process that compels consideration of ex ante motivations and
strategic behaviors. 16 Viewed from this light, preliminary injunction doctrine
can clearly be seen as an adaptive response to the impairment of parties'
incentives resulting from the uncertainty of entitlement assignments.
For concreteness, consider the following hypothetical involving a contract
for the provision of a well-specified good by a seller to a buyer who has paid a
fixed amount up front. 17 If we set the seller's cost to 70 and the buyer's value
to 100, performance of the contract would increase social welfare by placing
the good in the hands of the higher-valuing party (the buyer, in this case). The
possibility of expectation damages makes it in the personal interest of the seller
to do what is socially desirable. If she does not perform, the seller saves 70 in
terms of performance costs but must pay 100 in the form of expectation
damages to the buyer. The remedy thus aligns the seller's incentives with that
which is socially desirable. However, this simple implication does not hold
when liability is uncertain-a state of the world which, we again emphasize, is
reasonably presumed in the context of preliminary injunction hearings.
Uncertainty over entitlements changes the efficient breach calculation. For
example, imagine that the seller believes there is a 50% chance that her
obligation to perform, under the prevailing circumstances, will be legally
excused. Under these circumstances, she will not perform (though performance
results in the most efficient result), even when expectation damages are
perfectly estimated and fully compensatory. When deciding whether to
perform, the seller still compares the expected cost of performance (70) to the
expected damages for breaching. In this case, however, her expected damages
are now 50, reflecting the expectation damages (100) discounted by the
likelihood that the seller will not be held liable for breach (50%). 18 So the
rational, risk-neutral seller will not perform even though she may be required to
make the buyer whole ex post. This is not an efficient result. Liability rules
generally (and expectation damages specifically) do not preserve parties'
of such rights are not even approximate compensation." DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF
THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 122 (1991). While this point has merit, it is not the one we
advance here. Our claim is that even when damages provide approximate and adequate
compensation for individual harm, avoidable efficiency losses still accrue.
15. Cf Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 9.
16. Strategic use of preliminary injunctions by plaintiffs is not uncommon. Parties
often pursue preliminary actions, knowing that they are likely to get the same judge at the
final stage (especially in state courts) and that judge is unlikely to switch her views of the
merits subsequently. This may improve a party's bargaining power in settlement negotiations
or may offer some other strategic advantage over competitors. See id.
17. The upfront payment simplifies our example by allowing us to focus exclusively on
the seller's breach decision.
18. The expected cost of breaching is now a 50% chance of owing 100 and a 50%
chance of owing 0 (i.e., (100 x 50%) + (0 x 50%) = 50).
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incentives to behave efficiently in the context of legal uncertainty' 9-the
quintessential context of preliminary hearings.
20
The preliminary injunction restores efficiency to liability rules by taking
the breach decision out of the hands of the compromised seller. At the point
where the seller announces that she is going to breach, the buyer (if she does
nothing) expects a 50% chance of receiving 100 and nothing otherwise, leaving
her with an expected value of 50. If, however, the buyer seeks a preliminary
injunction, she will receive a value of 100 through performance, which
represents a net expected increase in value of 50 (i.e., 50% x 100) at an
expected cost of only 35 (i.e., 50% x 70, representing the 50% chance that she
will have to reimburse the seller's compliance cost if her injunction was
granted improperly). As a general matter, it is easy to show that the buyer will
compel performance through a preliminary injunction if, and only if,
performance is efficient. 21 Thus in the presence of legal uncertainty, a key (but
largely unappreciated) function of preliminary injunctions is to promote
efficiency.
Of course, indeterminacy of entitlement is not limited to cases involving
preliminary injunctions; it is not uncommon for parties to be unsure of their
future liabilities at the stage at which the efficient breach (or taking) hypothesis
requires them to calculate the expected costs and benefits of their planned
conduct. In these situations, in which the rights to be determined by the
proceedings are uncertain, the promised efficiency of liability rules cannot be
assured. Therefore, the implications of our analysis reach beyond preliminary
injunctions. As a point of departure into our analysis, we now briefly consider
the various legal rules which are, or might be, used in deciding whether to grant
a preliminary injunction.
19. Often, with liability rules, defendant-infringer is well positioned to weigh the costs
and benefits of her conduct. But uncertainty over entitlements biases her view of the benefits
because she is liable for compensating unrealized benefits in only some cases when she
infringes, while she faces the costs in all cases when she does not infringe. Preliminary
injunctions respond to infringers' discounting of damages by providing compensation to
defendants who are compelled to engage in conduct that is later determined not to be legally
required.
20. It is also important to emphasize that our results do not rest on an assumption of
symmetric perfect information among the parties. In fact, the most significant implication of
our model comes from an asymmetric information framework. That is, awarding a
preliminary injunction in essence converts a property rule into a temporary liability rule: the
party seeking the injunction has a limited call option, wherein she will have to pay court-
determined damages if it turns out that the entitlement belongs to the other party. Knowing
her private value and the distribution of harms to the other party from complying with the
injunction, the liability-rule-like preliminary injunction harnesses the party's private
information. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 11.
21. More generally, if the probability that the court will ultimately award the
entitlement to defendant is equal to (1 - P), 1 is plaintiff's value, and 1A is defendant's value,
then plaintiff will only seek a preliminary injunction if (I - P) x 1. > (1 - P) x 1A. See
discussion in Part III for a more formal and complete statement of this inequality.
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I. ARTICULATED STANDARDS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
As parties compete to prohibit or permit legally uncertain activities, courts
are asked to allocate consequential legal entitlements in preliminary
proceedings without the benefit of a full hearing. In his now-classic study, The
Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, John Leubsdorf describes numerous,
often inconsistent, articulated bases for preliminary relief: "Irreparable injury
may or may not be mentioned. Sometimes the injunction must not disserve the
public interest, sometimes it must serve the public interest, and sometimes only
the equities of the parties count." 22 Sometimes the decision turns on
maintaining the status quo, and other times facilitating change is key.
23
Articulated constraints on the merits of plaintiffs' claims indicate a similar lack
of consistency: "One line of cases requires plaintiffs to show a fair question on
the merits, another a substantial probability of success, another a reasonable
certainty, and another a clear right."
24
Professor Leubsdorf suggests a coherent rationale that underlies this
apparent confusion in the judicial opinions. The objective, according to this
rationale, is to prevent irreparable injury to the parties' legal rights.
25
Historically, courts of chancery issued injunctions to prevent actions at law as
well as to preserve them. Leubsdorf argues that this latter concern (i.e.,
preserving and protecting rights at law) was the precursor to contemporary
preliminary injunction analysis. 26 From this historical line, it is not difficult to
see how one could arrive at a standard based on the prevention of irreparable
injury to legal rights.
Yet, equitable courts sometimes issued preliminary injunctions that were
not contingent on actions at law or actions in other courts. "In some instances,
plaintiffs in suits properly instituted in Chancery needed immediate relief
pending the Chancellor's decision on the merits. They might seek, for example,
to stop equitable waste or to secure interim enforcement of a contract."
27
Departing from this historical line of cases might lead one to emphasize a
different standard for preliminary relief-a standard, for example, based on the
avoidance of waste or efficient enforcement of contracts.
28
22. Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 526 (footnotes omitted).
23. See Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 109, 111 n.4 (2001).
24. Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 526 (footnotes omitted).
25. Clearly visible traces of this objective were observable in eighteenth-century
English common law courts, where the separation of legal and equitable proceedings
frequently prompted judges to issue preliminary relief to protect rights at equity and law. Id.
at 527-32.
26. Id. at 528 ("Only [this class of cases] raised problems calling for the kind of
analysis we now apply, and the particularities of that class have shaped later learning on the
standard for preliminary injunctions.").
27. Id. at 529.
28. Indeed, as Professor Leubsdorf notes, "[o]wing in part to Jeremy Bentham .... the
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In his essay, Leubsdorf himself was quite hostile to the notion of judges
making utilitarian calculations when considering the issuance of preliminary
injunctions: 29 "The court's function is to protect rights, not to increase the
gross national product." 30 However, when rights are uncertain, as they are in
preliminary hearings, why shouldn't courts consider whether granting the
injunction will increase social welfare or avoid waste? This, admittedly, is not
among the stated justifications for preliminary injunctions advanced in judicial
opinions. These opinions, for the most part, take an ex post view, in which the
articulated concern is that damages awarded at the conclusion of the case may
be inade uate to compensate plaintiff for harm suffered during the pendency of
the case.1
A. Traditional Approaches
Despite the rhetorical variation in the case law, there is a widely shared
view that the purposes served by preliminary injunctions are maintaining the
status quo between the parties, preserving the court's ability to consider the
case fully, and minimizing the harm caused by erroneous preliminary decisions.
There is less apparent consensus on the best way to achieve these ends through
the use of preliminary injunctions. Most courts, when deciding whether to grant
an injunction, rely on a four-part standard that (to varying degrees) considers
(1) plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the amount of irreparable
utilitarian tide [that swept] away the division between law and equity [also] shaped thought
on preliminary injunctions, setting that thought adrift in search of a new foundation." Id. at
532 (footnotes omitted). Could this tide not have carried judicial thought about preliminary
injunctions to utilitarian shores? After all, it was around this time that "courts came to
require plaintiffs seeking interlocutory relief to accept liability for resulting damage" to
defendants. Id. at 534. And this requirement is, as we argue below, an essential move to
assure efficiency through the use of preliminary injunctions.
29. Leubsdorf maintained this attitude: "Even in common law nuisance cases where the
court must perform something like a cost-benefit analysis at trial, other considerations
control at the interlocutory hearing." Id. at 543 n.101. Leubsdorf felt that at the interlocutory
hearing, the court's "goal is to assess the probable loss of rights under various courses of
action, not to appraise the net social benefit from those courses." Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 555. Efficiency could never be a sufficient warrant for "interim
accommodation," according to Leubsdorf. Irreparability is always a necessary condition:
"The plaintiff must always demonstrate the possibility of irreparable loss." Id. at 551.
Leubsdorf did, however, recognize one category of preliminary injunctions-so-called
"statutory injunctions"-in which social policy may justify preliminary intervention without
a showing of irreparability. In these instances, "[t]he goal is not to minimize loss of rights in
specific cases, but to isolate classes of cases in which granting or denying relief under
specified tests will minimize harm to public policies." Id. at 565. But, of course, public
policy might reasonably include increasing aggregate social welfare or the gross national
product.
31. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., 780 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir.
1986) ("The premise of the preliminary injunction is that the remedy available at the end of
trial will not make the plaintiff whole; and, in a sense, the more limited that remedy, the
stronger the argument for a preliminary injunction .... ").
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harm likely in the absence of the injunction, (3) a balancing of expected harms
to plaintiff and those to defendant, and (4) the public interest. 32 Within the
jurisdictions that use this four-part standard, there is no uniform application.
33
Courts outside these jurisdictions apply entirely different standards that may,
for example, limit consideration to a combination of plaintiffs probable
success on the merits and her irreparable harm or a balance of hardships that
favors plaintiff.34 The Seventh Circuit, for instance, manages this balancing of
hardships by using a sliding-scale approach, which explicitly focuses on
minimizing harm caused by any erroneous decisions.
35
B. The Error-Minimizing Leubsdorf-Posner Formulation
Professor Leubsdorf draws from his historical and theoretical analysis a
rule that concisely captures the essential factors which should be considered in
deciding whether a preliminary injunction should be granted. The preliminary
injunction should be granted if the product of the probability that plaintiff will
prevail and the amount of uncompensated harm plaintiff will suffer during the
pendency of the litigation is greater than the product of the probability that
defendant will prevail and defendant's uncompensated costs of complying with
the injunction. If one assumes Professor Leubsdorf's posited objective, then his
formulation can be seen as an elegant statement of the considerations
underlying the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction.36 We depart
from Professor Leubsdorf by adopting a different objective: inducing socially
beneficial behavior during the pendency of litigation.
A simple numerical example may be helpful in illustrating the Leubsdorf
rule. 37 If plaintiff has a 60% chance of prevailing at the conclusion of the case
32. Lea B. Vaughn, A Need for Clarity: Toward a New Standard for Preliminary
Injunctions, 68 OR. L. REV. 839, 839-40 (1989).
33. Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform
Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 517-26 (2003).
34. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001);
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1996).
35. There is some question whether the Seventh Circuit has settled on a sliding-scale
approach to balancing harms. See Jones v. InfoCure Corp., 310 F.3d 529, 534-35 (7th Cir.
2002); see also Denlow, supra note 33, at 529-30.
36. Many commentators, however, do not share his vision. See infra note 42.
37. Leubsdorf's original numerical example is also illuminating. The structure,
however, is a little convoluted, so we summarize it here in a footnote and use a simpler
example in the text. "Suppose the plaintiff is an indigent who claims additional welfare
payments of $20 per month. With these payments, he could buy food in bulk at reduced
rates, increasing his purchasing power by $32 per month." Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 542
(footnotes omitted). The fact that the transaction will increase the value of the $20 welfare
payment to $32 is "legally irrelevant," and presumably the government cannot access this
transaction directly. Assume that $20 is the most the plaintiff can convert in any given month
and that a full trial will take five months to complete, during which time either the
government will lose $100 (i.e., $20 each month of the trial) or the plaintiff will lose $160
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and will suffer $1000 in damages during the pendency of the case which cannot
be remedied by an eventual award of damages, plaintiff's expected irreparable
loss from not being granted the injunction is $600. If plaintiff has a 60% chance
of prevailing, then defendant has a 40% chance of prevailing. 38 If defendant's
costs of complying with the injunction are $2000 and defendant will not be
compensated for any of these costs at the end of litigation, defendant's
expected irreparable loss if the injunction is granted is $800. Since defendant's
$800 expected irreparable loss if the injunction is granted exceeds the $600
expected irreparable loss that plaintiff will suffer if the injunction is not
granted, the injunction should not be granted under this framework.
Judge Richard Posner adopted the Leubsdorf framework in a frequently
cited and controversial opinion.39 Judge Posner prefaces his analysis by
reviewing the relevant case law and concluding that "it is not possible to
reconcile all the precedents, or even just all the ones in this circuit. But the
apparent discord is mostly verbal."'4° He concludes that underlying the
apparently inconsistent formulations is an effort to "minimize errors: the error
of denying an injunction to one who will in fact (though no one can know this
for sure) go on to win the case on the merits, and the error of granting an
injunction to one who will go on to lose."41 These "error costs" can be
minimized, as explained by Professor Leubsdorf, by comparing the product of
the probability of plaintiff's success and the would-be uncompensated harm to
plaintiff with the product of the probability of defendant's success and
defendant's would-be uncompensated costs of complying with the injunction.
We have no quarrel with the error-minimizing formulation if one accepts,
as Judge Posner and Professor Leubsdorf do, the conception of the preliminary
injunction expressed in the rhetoric of the case law.4 We believe, however,
(i.e., $32 per month). "Although calculable, these potential losses are irreparable because the
plaintiff is judgment-proof and the defendant has sovereign immunity from a judgment for
payments due in previous months." Id. (footnotes omitted). Assume also that there is a 40%
chance that plaintiff will prevail at the full hearing. Therefore, if the injunction is denied,
plaintiffs expected irreparable loss will be $64, which is a 40% chance of forever losing
$160. Similarly, the expected irreparable loss to defendant if the injunction is granted is $60
(which comes from having to make payments of $100 that will-with a 60% chance-be
deemed "legally unnecessary"). Id. "Since the estimated $64 loss from denying relief
exceeds the estimated $60 loss from granting it, the judge should grant a preliminary
injunction." Id. (footnotes omitted).
38. Of course, in the real world, the likelihood of prevailing need not be (and often is
not) so straightforward. Depending on how one understands success at trial, the probabilities
need not sum to one. For the purposes of this example, and the subsequent analysis, we
ignore this important complication and suggest that the curious reader review LAYCOCK,
supra note 14, at 118-20.
39. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., 780 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1986).
40. See Lee, supra note 23, at 11 n.4.
41. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984).
42. Numerous commentators (academic and judicial), however, do take issue with this
formulation. Within the Seventh Circuit, see, for example, American Hospital Supply Corp.,
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that this conception embodies a compensatory, ex post view of the purpose of
awarding damages that is at odds with the ex ante, incentive-oriented view of
the purpose of awarding damages implicit in the "efficient conduct hypotheses"
expressed by law and economics scholars. According to the Leubsdorf-Posner
view, the purpose underlying the grant or denial of the preliminary injunction is
to minimize the expected "irreparable" loss to both parties resulting from an
erroneous grant or denial of the preliminary injunction. As a result, an
erroneous grant or denial is of concern if the award of damages at the
conclusion of the case would not be fully compensatory. Similarly, even a
small chance of a wrongful grant or denial is of great concern if the award of
damages at the conclusion of the case would fall very short of full
compensation. By contrast, we our focus is whether judicial practice with
respect to the grant of preliminary injunctions creates incentives for efficient
conduct by defendant before and during the litigation.
Under our conception, an additional purpose of awarding damages at the
conclusion of the case is to induce efficient conduct prior to the conclusion of
the case. The traditional conception is exclusively focused on providing
compensation for harm resulting from the erroneous grant or denial of a
preliminary injunction. In a world in which plaintiff was certain to win and
damages were fully compensatory, there would be no need to choose between
the two conceptions of damages. Certain, fully compensatory damages at the
conclusion of the case would ensure efficient behavior by defendant during the
pendency of the litigation. There would be no role for a preliminary injunction.
If an injunction were granted, it would direct defendant to do what she would
do anyway. If no injunction were issued, defendant would, nevertheless, have
the incentive to do what an injunction would have compelled her to do.
When, however, there is uncertainty regarding to whom the entitlement at
issue will be assigned, as is often the case, it is necessary to choose one
conception or the other. Under the traditional view, the relevance of the
uncertainty is that it creates the possibility that the assignment of entitlement,
implicit in the grant or denial of the preliminary injunction, may prove to be
erroneous. The Leubsdorf-Posner rule governing the issuance of a preliminary
injunction is designed to minimize the expected costs resulting from an
erroneous grant of the entitlement. From an incentive-oriented view, the
relevance of uncertainty is that it may make it impossible for the grant of
damages at the conclusion of the case to ensure efficient conduct by defendant.
780 F.2d at 608-10 (Swygert, J., dissenting), and Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual
Hospital Insurance, Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1346-47 (1986) (Will, J., concurring). See also
LAYCOCK, supra note 14, at 118-23; Linda S. Mullenix, Burying (with Kindness) the
Felicific Calculus of Civil Procedure, 40 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1987); Linda J. Silberman,
Injunctions by the Numbers: Less than the Sum of Its Parts, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 279
(1987); Vaughn, supra note 32.
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C. Our Alternative Formulation
At this point, it may be useful to explain more fully our alternative
formulation. First, we emphasize that liability determination is not
instantaneous and is often uncertain at the times when the parties must make
important decisions. These decisions generally have efficiency implications; we
are concerned with how preliminary injunctions influence decisions during this
period of indeterminacy. If the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction
induces inefficient behavior, then a social loss occurs-a loss which cannot be
undone by a subsequent transfer of money from one party to another. As a
result, for our analysis, it is not of primary concern that plaintiff, by reason of
the award of damages, is as well off as if there had been no infringement of her
entitlement or that, by reason of reimbursement of compliance costs, defendant
is as well off as if she had not complied with the injunctive orders. By contrast,
the traditional view holds that no harm is done if plaintiff (assuming the
injunction is denied) later receives sufficient compensation for harm caused by
defendant's infringement or if a defendant (assuming the injunction is granted)
who ultimately prevails receives sufficient compensation for the costs of
compliance. Pursuant to this view, it is unimportant whether the injunction is
issued so long as adequate compensation is provided ex post. The adequacy of
ex post compensation, under the traditional view, is an independent reason not
to issue a preliminary injunction, but not so under our view. Under our
framework, ex post compensation is never adequate by itself because it cannot
eliminate the social loss resulting from the inefficient conduct. In simple terms,
the traditional view focuses on distributing the loss between the parties. We
focus on minimizing the loss.
Even with adequate ex post compensation, the need for preliminary
injunctions remains, not only as a response to uncertainty but also as the result
of a basic asymmetry in the substantive law. In most instances, injured parties
can recover damages for harm caused by infringement of their legal
entitlements, but someone who avoids a potential infringement, although not
obliged to do so, can seldom recover the costs of such avoidance. This
asymmetry creates a systematic bias toward infringement. Defendant prefers
the certain benefits of infringing, at the discounted price of possibly being held
liable. However, in those instances where a party who avoids a potential
infringement, when not obliged to do so, can recover the costs of avoidance,
there is no bias toward infringement and no need for a preliminary injunction.
Our analysis highlights a feature of a preliminary injunction regime that we
believe has not been assigned sufficient importance. It is true that the issuance
of a preliminary injunction assures performance by posing the certain threat of
in terrorem damages if the injunction is violated. It is, however, also true that
plaintiff can only obtain a preliminary injunction by assuming liability for
defendant's compliance costs if defendant prevails at the conclusion of the
case. The preliminary injunction, then, counteracts the bias toward
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infringement which would exist in its absence by threatening defendant with in
terrorem damages, while rewarding her with possible compensatory damages if
she prevails at the conclusion of the litigation.
By making the question of interest whether defendant will behave
efficiently, we identify an important defect in the theoretical underpinnings of
the traditional view of preliminary injunctions. Consider, for example, a case
involving a threatened breach of contract. Two different questions arise here:
first, whether it is better for defendant to perform, and second, whether the
costs of nonperformance or performance-whichever is the efficient result-
should be borne by plaintiff or defendant. Whether it is better for defendant to
perform depends on whether the value of performance to plaintiff is greater or
less than the highest valued option to defendant (the opportunity cost of
performance). The question whether the costs of nonperformance or
performance should be borne by plaintiff or defendant depends on whether, in
the relevant contract or controlling legal rule, this risk has been assigned to
plaintiff or defendant. The basic flaw of the traditional approach is that the
question of who should bear the costs of nonperformance or performance
constitutes the only element in the determination of whether performance will
be compelled.
In the next Part, we elaborate on our analysis by posing a hypothetical case
in which liability is uncertain. We then determine whether defendant will
behave efficiently under each of three possible rules with respect to the
issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1) the Leubsdorf-Posner error-cost-
minimizing rule, (2) a rule that preliminary injunctions are never available, and
(3) a rule that preliminary injunctions can always be obtained. After
considering the traditional error-minimizing rule, we focus our attention on a
hypothetical world in which no preliminary injunction is available. This
exercise permits us to capture both the reasons why a preliminary injunction is
needed and the problems that arise when preliminary injunctions are available.
In the end, we conclude that it is optimal to allow a preliminary injunction
whenever plaintiff is prepared to assume liability if, at the conclusion of the
case, it is held that defendant was not obliged to bear the costs of performance.
1I. MODEL AND ANALYSIS
We motivate this analysis by considering two hypothetical cases which
pose the same analytic issues.4 3 In one case, there is a contract requiring
43. In order to focus on the consequences of uncertainty, which we believe to be the
most important piece in the preliminary injunction puzzle, we shall (in the model, but not
generally) assume away an important complicating factor. Damages may be "too high" in the
sense of exceeding the costs actually experienced as a result of conduct held to be unlawful
or "too low" in the sense of being less than the costs actually experienced as a result of the
conduct held to be unlawful. If damages are too high or too low, incentives will be impaired.
A complete analysis of any incentive regime would have to take these possibilities into
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defendant to deliver goods at a date during the pendency of the litigation. In the
contract, however, there is an exculpatory clause which may excuse defendant
from performing. However, uncertainty pervades as to how the exculpatory
clause will be interpreted. Both parties agree that there is a 60% chance that
plaintiff will prevail if defendant chooses not to perform and the "breach" is
challenged in court. In the second hypothetical, plaintiff claims that defendant
is committing a nuisance and is obliged to discontinue the harmful activity or
eliminate its harmful effects. If defendant fails to do either, plaintiff contends
that defendant will be responsible for paying damages to her for the harm that
is caused. Defendant responds by claiming that plaintiff "came to the nuisance"
and should, consequently, be denied relief. The parties agree that there is a 60%
chance that plaintiff will prevail with respect to defendant's contention. We
consider whether defendant will be induced to behave efficiently under each of
the four possible rules.
For ease of exposition we focus on the contract hypothetical.4 4
Performance under the contract example, consisting of delivery of the goods, is
analytically equivalent to the discontinuation of the harmful activity or
rendering it harmless in the nuisance case. The claim of nonobligation by
reason of the exculpatory clause is equivalent to the "coming to the nuisance"
defense. The equivalence consists of the fact that, in invoking the exculpatory
clause of the contract, defendant claims that plaintiff must bear the costs
resulting from nondelivery of the goods; in the nuisance case, defendant
account. We simply assume away this complication.
44. As an explicit example of the contract hypothetical, consider the following: In
1988, PC Brand, Inc., a mail-order dealer of clone IBM personal computers, negotiated an
"Advertising Rights Agreement" with Anthony Gold, the result of which provided PC Brand
with a 23.5% discount on the standard advertising rates in PC Magazine. Gold v. Ziff
Commc'ns Co., 553 N.E.2d 404, 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). Anthony Gold, the founder of PC
Magazine, acquired the original discount right in exchange for his control interest in the
magazine. After several months, the new owners of PC Magazine determined that they were
not required to continue the arrangement due to an improper assignment of the discount
right. The initial agreement with Gold stipulated that the right was not assignable or
transferable to other persons or entities, but could be used by a company in which Gold
owned at least 51% of the voting stock.
In 1988, Gold formed PC Brand with Stephen Dukker, in which Gold held 90% of the
outstanding shares of the company and Dukker held the remaining 10%. The owners of PC
Magazine maintained that actual control rested with Dukker and "that Gold did not really
own at least 51% of the voting stock ..... Id. Therefore, the magazine claimed the right had
been assigned to PC Brand in contravention to the agreement. This claim raised a legitimate
legal question that could not be answered before the next issue of the magazine was due to
come out. Thus, PC Brand filed for a preliminary injunction to prevent the magazine from
abandoning the agreement during the litigation concerning the assignment. Officials of the
company testified that
PC Brand had been formed to take advantage of the discounted advertising rate and that the
operation of PC Brand was structured around the advertising discount ... [and] PC Brand
would probably be forced out of business were it not able to advertise at the discount[ed] rate
for even one month ....
Id. at 407.
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contends that, by reason of the "coming to the nuisance" defense, plaintiff must
bear the costs imposed on her by defendant's nuisance activity. No matter who
must bear the costs resulting from nondelivery of the goods or the continuation
of the nuisance conduct, the different questions whether it is better that the
goods are not delivered or whether it is more beneficial that defendant engage
in the nuisance conduct must be answered.
A. The Leubsdorf-Posner Formulation of the Traditional Balancing Rule
The central focus of our analysis is whether delivery of goods, pursuant to
a contract, is to occur during the pendency of the litigation. Defendant contends
that, under the terms of an exculpatory clause in the contract, she is excused
from supplying the goods at her expense. The traditional preliminary injunction
rule employs a balancing of irreparable harms designed to minimize expected
error costs. The court compares "the harm to plaintiff if preliminary relief is
erroneously denied and the harm to defendant if preliminary relief is
erroneously granted."' 45 The Leubsdorf-Posner formulation of the rule offers a
precise statement of the error-minimizing approach. This approach is
undertaken by comparing the product of the probability that plaintiff will
prevail at the conclusion of the case and the uncompensated damages she will
suffer if the injunction is not issued with the product of the probability that
defendant will prevail and the costs of complying with the injunction that will
not be compensated by the award of damages at the conclusion of the case.
Thus, under the Leubsdorf-Posner rule, a preliminary injunction is awarded
only if
P x Hit > (1 - P) x HA
where P is the probability that plaintiff will ultimately prevail at the conclusion
of the full trial, H, is the irreparable harm that plaintiff will suffer if the
injunction is not granted, and HA is the irreparable harm that defendant will
suffer if the injunction is granted.
The traditional view of the preliminary injunction, including the
Leubsdorf-Posner version, does not purport to create incentives for efficient
behavior. Not surprisingly, then, neither of the factors which, under this rule,
determine whether a preliminary injunction will be granted (i.e., irreparable
harm and likelihood of plaintiffs success in securing damages at the
conclusion of the case) would be included in a rule designed to induce
allocatively efficient behavior. According to the traditional view, the court
ought not to consider the full cost to plaintiff of not receiving the goods, but
rather that portion of the cost which would not be offset by the award of
damages to plaintiff at the conclusion of the case. Similarly, not all
45. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV.
687, 728 (1990).
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performance costs of defendant are considered, but only those that would not
be compensated if defendant prevails. But if the objective of the rule is to
induce allocatively efficient behavior, all of the costs of each party should be
compared to determine whether the value of the goods to plaintiff is greater or
less than the cost to defendant of providing them to plaintiff. It is elementary
that a decision mandating inefficient behavior results in the social cost of a
misallocation of resources. A later monetary transfer does not change the
magnitude of this loss.
The second factor included in the traditional test (i.e., likelihood of the
parties' success) is equally inappropriate if the ultimate objective is to induce
efficient behavior. When a plaintiff succeeds at trial, she will be awarded
damages for the harm caused by defendant's nonperformance at the conclusion
of the case. The question of which party is to bear the costs of nonperformance
is different from the question of whether it is efficient for defendant to provide
the goods to plaintiff. This latter concern is the rationale for the doctrine of
efficient breach. The essential premise of the doctrine is that defendant should
perform only if it is efficient to do so. The question of who should bear the
costs resulting from nonperformance is a separate one. If the exculpatory clause
is construed so as not to free defendant from performing, defendant will be
required to compensate plaintiff for the costs resulting from nonperformance. If
the exculpatory clause is interpreted to free defendant from the obligation to
perform, plaintiff will bear the cost of nonperformance. The same reasoning
applies if performance is efficient. If the exculpatory clause is construed
favorably for defendant, plaintiff will be obliged to reimburse defendant for her
costs of performance. If the clause is construed favorably for plaintiff,
defendant will be required to bear the costs of performance. For these reasons,
it is pure happenstance whether a preliminary injunction granted under the
traditional rule leads to efficient or inefficient outcomes. A refusal to issue the
injunction may leave defendant unconstrained when she should be constrained,
and granting the injunction may leave defendant constrained when she should
be unconstrained.
B. If Preliminary Injunctions Were Never Available
The first alternative to the traditional rule we consider is one in which
plaintiffs are unable to obtain preliminary injunctions in any circumstances. We
consider two variants of such a rule. Under the first variant, a defendant who
performs under the contract and is later adjudged not to have been obliged to do
so can recover her costs of performance. In the second variant, reimbursement
for performance costs is not available. We conclude that if compensation is
available to cover performance costs, defendant will perform when it is
efficient to do so. Absent reimbursement, as in the second variant, defendant
will not perform even when performance is efficient.
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1. Incentives when compensation is provided for nonobligatory
performance
Whether defendant delivers the goods depends in large part on her
opportunity costs of doing so (i.e., her outside option). We define defendant's
outside option as 1A, plaintiff's value of the goods as 4,, and the probability that
plaintiff will be given the entitlement at the end of a full hearing as P, where
P = 60% for the purposes of our hypothetical. By delivering the goods,
defendant avoids all expected liability and gains a net expected benefit of
(1 - P)IA, assuming that she is compensated for the costs of supplying the goods
when it turns out that she was not obligated to do so. Against this value,
defendant weighs the net expected payoff of her nondelivery, which is
determined by the difference between the expected costs of not delivering the
goods to plaintiff, P x 4, and the benefits of not supplying the goods. That is,
by not delivering the goods, defendant gets her outside option value with
certainty. However, since defendant was already ensured to receive this value
at the conclusion of the final hearing with probability (1 - P), nondelivery
merely adds probability weight P to defendant's realization of her outside
option. Unfortunately for defendant, nondelivery also adds the probability P
that she will be held liable for plaintiff's value. Defendant takes all these
considerations into account and delivers the goods only if her net expected
payoff from delivery exceeds her net expected payoff from nondelivery, i.e.,
(1 - P)IA > (1 - P)IA + P x 1A - P x l4
which simplifies to
Px l" > P X IA.
The inequality above implies that defendant will deliver the goods only if
their value to plaintiff exceeds defendant's cost of supplying them (i.e., lt > lA).
This private calculation is equivalent to the criterion for the assurance of
allocative efficiency-namely, that the contract should be performed if and
only if the value of performance is greater than its cost. The intuitive
explanation of this result is as follows: Assume, for example, that 1" = 1000,
1A = 900, and P = 60%. Allocative efficiency favors delivery because plaintiff
values the goods more than defendant. Yet, it would seem that defendant might
choose not to perform and thereby gain 900 (the value of the goods to her)
while incurring an expected liability of only 600 (a 60% chance of being forced
to pay compensation of 1000 to plaintiff), leaving her with a net expected gain
of 300. However, the analysis is not complete. If defendant does perform, she
earns an expected gain of 360 (a 40% chance of realizing her value of 900)
with no associated liability. 46 Therefore defendant is better off performing. The
46. Thus by choosing nonperformance, defendant realizes only 540, or the difference
between her value of possessing the goods with certainty and her expected compensation.
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crucial point in this analysis is that nonperformance allows defendant to obtain
a 60% gain in her overall value at a cost of 60% of plaintiffs value. Since the
probabilities attached to the gains and costs of nonperformance are the same,
the determinative factor is whether defendant or plaintiff values the goods
more. This is, of course, the same comparison which determines whether
performance will be efficient.
2. Incentives when there is no compensation for nonobligatory
performance
Now consider an alternative formulation of the rule that preliminary
injunctions are never available. Instead of defendant expecting to recover her
costs of performarce when she delivers although she ultimately would not have
been required to do so (i.e., (I - P)lA), assume that she expects no
compensation when she foregoes her entitlement to withhold delivery (i.e.,
0).4 Under this assumption, defendant will deliver the goods only if
0> (1 - P)lA + P X 1A - P X l
which reduces to
P X l" > lA.
Note that this decision rule may lead to allocatively inefficient outcomes.
Recall from the example above, in which l = 1000 and 1A = 900, that the
optimal outcome is that plaintiff should receive the goods. However, in this
case, defendant earns an expected net gain of 300 (saving 900 in performance
costs and incurring 600 in liability costs) by not delivering the goods.
4 8
Defendant will therefore not deliver, which is the allocatively inefficient result.
C. If Preliminary Injunctions Were Always Available
Now consider a rule that is the opposite of the rule of "no preliminary
injunctions with ex post damages": plaintiff can obtain a preliminary injunction
as long as she is willing to assume liability for defendant's costs of complying
with the injunction in the event that the court, at the conclusion of the case,
rules in favor of defendant.
Moreover, this gain of 540 is purchased at the expense of assuming an expected liability of
600.
47. Generally, a party cannot (absent an express or implied agreement) perform and
then later claim that she was not obligated to perform and, therefore, that she should be
awarded damages equal to her opportunity costs of performance.
48. That is, defendant's expected costs of the breaching conduct (60% x 1000 = 600)
are less than her expected benefits (100% x 900 = 900).
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1. Incentives when compensation is provided for nonobligatory
performance
Plaintiff will only seek the injunction if the value of the goods to her
exceeds the costs to defendant of supplying the goods. We remind the reader
that this conclusion holds only if plaintiff will be required to reimburse
defendant for her compliance costs whenever the court, at the conclusion of the
case, holds that plaintiff is obliged to bear the costs of nondelivery of the
goods. To demonstrate this conclusion, we first note that obtaining the
preliminary injunction gives plaintiff the monetary value of getting the goods
with certainty (i.e., l,), although it imposes liability with expected cost equal to
(1 - P)lA. By refraining from obtaining the preliminary injunction, plaintiff
receives the monetary equivalent of the value she places on the goods with P
probability (i.e., P x l,), while imposing no expected liability. Therefore,
plaintiff will obtain the injunction only if
1" -(I - P)lA > P X I"
which reduces to
(1 - P)l, > (1 - P)A.
The inequality above implies that plaintiff will obtain the preliminary
injunction only if she values the goods more than defendant does (i.e., 1" > lA).
Therefore, this rule too provides the correct incentives in terms of allocative
efficiency. This is because the determinative factor in plaintiff's decision of
whether to obtain the injunction is whether she values the goods more than
defendant. By obtaining a preliminary injunction, plaintiff receives her value of
the goods (1,) with an increased likelihood of 40% and has to pay defendant's
value of the goods (IA) with an increased likelihood of 40% (compared to not
seeking the preliminary injunction). So long as 40% x 14 > 40% x 1A (or 14 > 1A),
plaintiff will obtain the preliminary injunction, and the result will be an
efficient one. This result should be considered in light of our previous
discussion. In the previous Part, we focused on the importance of the right to
compensation when someone performs, and it is later determined she was not
obligated to do so. We concluded that if this right exists, there would be no
need for a preliminary injunction to encourage allocatively efficient behavior.
What the present discussion demonstrates is that the preliminary injunction
provides exactly such a right to compensation. In the present context, this right
disciplines plaintiff to compel performance only when performance would be
efficient.
49
Importantly, this result holds regardless of what plaintiff believes her
chances of prevailing to be. Whatever the chances may be, plaintiff gains the
same proportion of the value and the cost by assuming contingent liability for
49. The importance of this discipline becomes obvious in infra Part II.C.2.
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defendant's cost of performance. 50 Since the two proportions are identical,
plaintiffs decision will depend on whether the value of the goods to her is
greater or less than defendant's cost of supplying the goods.
We emphasize one important implication of this analysis. This rule could,
in some circumstances, require defendant to deliver the goods even though the
court holds at the conclusion of the case that plaintiff, rather than defendant, is
obliged to bear the costs of performance. This could be characterized as
coercive. However, as we discuss more fully in the next Parts, we see no
problem with this situation so long as there is genuine uncertainty over the
entitlement at the time when the preliminary injunction is sought.
2. Incentives when there is no compensation for nonobligatory
performance
Finally, imagine plaintiff can always obtain a preliminary injunction
without having to compensate defendant for nonobligatory performance ex
post. Without the constraint of ex post compensation to defendants ultimately
found not contractually obligated to perform, plaintiffs would compel too much
performance. Plaintiff receives a payoff of 4, by compelling performance,
whereas she gets only P x 4, when performance is not undertaken. Since 4, is
always greater than P x l1, plaintiff will always seek an injunction.
D. Implications: An Asymmetry in Substantive Law
Comparing a world in which preliminary injunctions are never granted to
one in which they can always be obtained, our analysis reveals that allocative
efficiency is achievable so long as parties are compensated for their
probabilistic interests in entitlements-which is to say defendant receives (in
expectation) (1 - P)lA when the goods are delivered, and plaintiff receives
P x 1, when the goods are not delivered. Thus, if defendant delivers the goods
and it is later determined that she was not obliged to do so, the presence 5 1 or
absence 52 of preliminary relief will have no (allocative) efficiency implications
50. What plaintiff weighs when deciding whether to assume contingent liability for
defendant's compliance cost in exchange for the increased probability of securing the goods
resulting from the grant of the preliminary injunction is her net payoff from obtaining or not
obtaining the preliminary injunction. In the end, she compares the expected value of
increasing the chance of obtaining the goods against the cost of increasing the chance of
being required to reimburse defendant for her costs of supplying the goods. No matter what
plaintiff believes to be her chances of prevailing, the relative magnitude of these two values
will be decisive in her decision whether to compel delivery through the preliminary
injunction.
51. Where preliminary injunctions are available, the decision regarding preliminary
delivery of the goods is in the hands of plaintiff: inequality (1 - P)I4 > (1 - P)lA implies that
the goods will be delivered to plaintiff whenever delivery is efficient (i.e., l, > 1A).
52. Where preliminary injunctions are unavailable, the decision of whether the goods
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so long as she is compensated for her "unobliged" delivery. The problem with
this scenario is that defendants tr'pically have no such right to recovery when
they enjoin their own behavior, 5 although they do have such right when their
behavior is constrained by plaintiffs through preliminary injunction orders.
54
This simple, yet prevalent, asymmetry in the law provides a strong
efficiency justification for preliminary injunctions even when damages are fully
compensatory. Indeed, the availability of fully compensatory damages in this
setting highlights the fact that preliminary injunctions essentially protect
defendants by inducing plaintiffs to internalize defendants' compliance costs
when deciding whether to seek preliminary injunctions. Absent preliminary
injunctions or private agreements, 55 the law generally does not recognize this
probabilistic interest, thereby encouraging inefficient self-help in the form of
nonperformance and infringement by prospective defendants. Unfortunately,
the traditional balancing of irreparable harms in the case law is at odds with the
inherent efficiency properties of preliminary injunctions.
III. WHICH RULE SHOULD BE EMPLOYED?
Under the traditional rule, if damages are adequate, then preliminary
injunctions are never granted. However, as argued in the previous Part,
preliminary injunctions serve an important efficiency function even when
will be delivered is entirely in the hands of defendant: inequality P x 1. > P x 1A implies that
the goods will be delivered to plaintiff whenever delivery is efficient (i.e., 1 > la).
53. In our hypothetical, this type of self-regulation would be in the form of choosing to
perform though not so obligated. We put aside the complication that there are cases where
such self-imposed constraints on behavior may allow for recovery under a theory of
restitution, quantum meruit, quantum valebat, or implied contract, which all largely rely on
the other party being unjustly enriched by the conduct of the first party. Absent such unjust
enrichment, there is generally no right to recover compensation for engaging in (or
abstaining from) conduct not legally required. "If a performance is rendered by one person
without any request by another, it is very unlikely that this person will be under a legal duty
to pay compensation." ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 234 (1951). Leubsdorf
too recognized this constraint: "[Slome courts have used theories of restitution to make a
plaintiff disgorge profits unjustly earned under an erroneous preliminary decree." Leubsdorf,
supra note 13, at 559. It is important to emphasize that Leubsdorf is speaking of equitable
recovery within the context of a preliminary injunction. Without the preliminary decree
compelling defendant's conduct, a claim for equitable restitution becomes even more
speculative, and the transaction costs of pursuing it will often be prohibitive.
54. Historically, the requirement that a plaintiff, in order to obtain a preliminary
injunction, must assume liability for defendant's compliance costs if defendant prevails at
the conclusion of the case was introduced because otherwise defendant's only remedy would
be an action for malicious prosecution. Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 558.
55. If transaction costs are not prohibitive, the parties could in theory create a legal
right to such compensation by writing an appropriate contract and thereby limiting the need
for preliminary injunctions to serve this function. Yet, one can imagine that the same factors
that give rise to preliminary hearings are also likely to constrain the parties' ability to
negotiate such contracts.
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damages are perfectly adequate. The traditional balancing analysis obscures
this function by unnecessarily predicating the award on the likelihood of
irreparable injuries and the probability that one party or the other must bear the
costs of performance or nonperformance. For traditionalists, "the possibility of
irreparable loss [is necessary] in order to rouse the court to action." 56 But
imagine a preliminary injunction rule (we will call it the "interim-efficiency
rule") in which the court merely addresses the question whether defendant's
behavior that plaintiff seeks to compel is efficient, without regard to irreparable
harm to legal rights or the distribution of the costs of performance or
nonperformance. We begin the discussion with this stark thought experiment
and conclude with a discussion of a preliminary injunction liability rule, which
we argue mimics significantly the apparent standard in many courts today.
A. Interim-Efficiency Rule
Under the interim-efficiency rule, plaintiff can compel defendant to
provide the goods or services that are the subject of the contract only if she
demonstrates that I, > lA (i.e., it is allocatively efficient for defendant to do
so).57 Because allocatively efficient behavior is the same whether or not
defendant is obliged to compensate plaintiff if she is denied the benefits of
performance, there is no necessity for the court to decide the compensation
issue at the preliminary hearing. If the court believes that the conduct that
plaintiff seeks to compel would be inefficient, it simply refuses to grant the
injunction. Defendant, constrained only by the uncertain possibility of paying
damages, will in many instances choose not to perform. At the conclusion of
the case, the court can decide whether plaintiff is entitled to damages for harm
resulting from defendant's failure to perform.
One obvious difficulty with this rule, as with all the rules, is that the factual
issues it implicates are not easy to resolve. The court must determine the value
of performance to plaintiff and the opportunity costs of performance for
defendant. We do not minimize the difficulty of resolving these factual issues.
We do, however, point out that the traditional balancing rule requires a
determination of these issues as well as other difficult ones. The Leubsdorf-
Posner formulation of the rule, like the interim-efficiency rule, requires the
court to determine how much better off plaintiff would be if defendant
performed (1,) and how much worse off defendant would be if obliged to
56. Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 551. Leubsdorf adds a historical note as well: "While
irreparable injury was mentioned occasionally as a ground for equitable intervention in the
eighteenth century, the next century saw it invoked in virtually all the situations where
injunctions issued to protect rights at law." Id. at 533.
57. Note that this formulation does not account for the uncertainty of the underlying
litigation: "If courts could inflict loss on one party in order to increase the profits of another,
the parties' probabilities of prevailing on the merits and the substantive law would drop out
of preliminary injunction decisions." Id. at 555.
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perform (lA). While this information is sufficient to help the court implement
the interim-efficiency rule, the traditional rule requires more. To clarify, we
will define irreparable harm (H) as the difference between the harm suffered by
party i (li) and the compensation that i will receive from the party who is liable
for the harm (ci). The irreparable harm to plaintiff is thus equal to H, = 1, - CA,
and the irreparable harm to defendant is equal to HA = 1A - cl. Using this
definition, the Leubsdorf-Posner formula may be rewritten as follows:
P X 1, - CA > (I - P) X (lA - CJ )
Thus, in addition to finding l, and 1A, the court must determine (1) whether
the compensation awarded at the conclusion of the case will be adequate for
both parties, (2) how likely it is that defendant will have to pay damages to
plaintiff if no preliminary injunction is issued, and (3) how likely it is that
plaintiff will have to pay damages to defendant if a preliminary injunction is
issued. We do not wish to claim too much. All we say is that implementation of
the interim-efficiency rule is no more costly, and probably less costly, than
implementation of the Leubsdorf-Posner rule.
58
Beyond implementation, there remains the more central concern of the
interim-efficiency rule's abandonment of the consideration of irreparable harm
to the parties' legal rights. Most observers would agree that the court "should
not, for instance, enjoin a legal strike even if it is shown that the injunction
would profit the employer far more than it harms the employees." 59 Of course,
the legality of the strike is the issue that cannot be determined before the court
rules on the injunction. Certainly, when the strike is lawful, the court ought not
to enjoin it because it is efficient, nor should the court allow an unlawful strike
that happens to be efficient. When, however, the court is uncertain about the
legality of the conduct, which is the sin nan quo of the preliminary injunctive
action, the correct decision is less clear. Yet, suppose that "rain employer who
seeks to enjoin a strike, for example, can be required to post bond to
compensate his employees if it turns out that the strike was lawful."'60 We
believe that this standard, with or without emphasis on irreparability, ought to
be more centrally located within the articulated preliminary injunction doctrine,
regardless of whether one is primarily concerned about compensation,
efficiency, or both. We refer to this standard as the "preliminary injunction
liability rule," to which the discussion now turns.
58. Irreparability or inadequacy of awards may be understood as something other than
a shortfall in damages, as characterized above. For example, inadequacy may be driven by
uncertainty or incommensurability of the award. These alternative understandings of
irreparability and inadequacy do not, however, undermine our general point that the
traditional rule imposes significantly greater evidentiary burdens on the court than an
interim-efficiency rule.
59. Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 555.
60. Id.
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B. Preliminary Injunction Liability Rule
Under the liability-rule framework, a preliminary injunction would be
awarded whenever a genuine issue over entitlement ownership is shown and
plaintiff is prepared to assume liability if, at the conclusion of the case, it is
held that defendant was not obliged to perform but for the injunctive orders.
Importantly, the court need not engage in an analysis of irreparable harms (H,
and HA). In fact, the court would only be required to determine one party's
value-namely, defendant's compliance costs. 6
Plaintiff recognizes that she will have to pay (1 - P)lA in expectation
damages if the preliminary injunction is secured and also recognizes that the
additional benefit of securing the preliminary injunction is only valued at
(1 - P)l,, because she already has probability P of receiving l, at the end of the
full hearing. Therefore plaintiff will post the bond and secure the preliminary
injunction only if
(1 - P)I11 > (I - PYlA,
which is equivalent to the socially efficient criterion. Thus, plaintiffs decision
to assume contingent liability for defendant's compliance costs in order to
secure the preliminary injunction ensures that the injunction will be sought only
when performance is efficient.
The desirability of the preliminary injunction liability rule may be most
compelling in the presence of asymmetric information among the litigants and
the court, which we take to be the usual case. When litigants have better
information than the court, the superior information held by plaintiff or
defendant may be enlisted through a preliminary injunction order conditional
upon plaintiff assuming liability for defendant's compliance costs in the event
that, at the conclusion of the case, it is held that plaintiff is obliged to bear the
costs of defendant's performance or nonperformance. If plaintiffs ability to
compensate defendant were in doubt, the court, as it presently may, could
require plaintiff to post a bond to assure payment. To see how this rule would
operate, assume that defendant's costs of complying with the preliminary
injunctive award (lA) are known to the court, while plaintiff's costs resulting
from being denied performance are private information, known only to
plaintiff.62 In this setting, plaintiff (who possesses superior information about
the costs of nonperformance) can make efficient choices about whether to seek
the preliminary injunction.
Admittedly, under this rule, the court, at the conclusion of the case, must
61. With regard to efficiency, the determination of the parties' value may also be
widely inaccurate so long as the errors are unbiased. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 11,
at 730 & n.50.
62. This assumption could be weakened by allowing defendant's compliance costs (/A)
to be more easily verified than plaintiff's costs of being denied performance (1,).
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with sufficient accuracy (i.e., without bias) determine defendant's compliance
costs, and plaintiff, in deciding whether to seek the injunction, must sufficiently
anticipate what those costs will be. However, the requirement that plaintiff
assume a contingent liability for defendant's compliance costs in order to
secure the injunction provides a powerful incentive for plaintiff to determine
what those costs will be. Moreover, the court will not have to determine the
magnitude of these costs until after they are actually incurred and the case is
finally determined. In light of all of this, we believe that, as a matter of legal
process, this rule is superior to other rules which might be employed (in many
important respects).
63
Despite its desirable features, the preliminary injunction liability rule must
respond to the objections that are made about liability rules more generally.
The strongest of these objections has been made in terms of rights and duties
that are unjustly priced and purchased without the rights holder's or obligee's
express consent. 64 Akhil Amar, for instance, has voiced this objection in
arguing that liability rules are generally inappropriate constitutional remedies;
65
Charles Fried has issued a similar challenge to liability rules in contracts.
66
There is, however, one key consideration that renders these constitutional and
contractual challenges inapplicable to the preliminary injunction liability rule.
In the context of the preliminary hearing, the ownership of the underlying
rights has not been determined authoritatively. As a result, when the
preliminary injunction is granted or denied, each party has an expected
(probabilistic) interest in the entitlement. Since the entitlement does not clearly
belong to either party, the challenge of unjust nonconsensual appropriation
through a preliminary injunction liability rule holds less weight than when
breach of contract or constitutional infringement is clear.
67
Put somewhat differently, legal uncertainty prior to an authoritative
determination of the case is an inescapable reality. Analysis predicated upon
one party or the other having the entitlement is simply not helpful. The issue is
63. While we assumed away the issue of whether ex post damages will be
undercompensatory for our analysis, see supra note 43, the issue of course remains a salient
consideration. If the court suspects (or defendant argues) that plaintiff will be judgment-
proof or otherwise unable to compensate the defendant's nonobliged performance, then this
factor should surely weigh on (though not necessarily be determinative of) the court's
willingness to grant a preliminary injunction.
64. Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 555 (footnotes omitted) ("In some cases, of course, a
forced sale of this kind will be impractical or unjust, and the court should consider loss of
freedom as one of the costs of this approach.").
65. See generally AMAR, supra note 12.
66. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981).
67. Consider, for example, the question of a possible breach when contractual
obligations are uncertain. As the promisor believes that she is not obligated to perform,
nonperformance with the risk of possible damages is a sensible route since, as we mentioned
earlier, the promisor will face significant hurdles in trying to receive compensation for
performance that is not legally required.
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what is to be done in a world characterized by uncertainty. We believe that,
taking everything into account, the liability rule we propose is a candidate for
dealing with a problem that has received far too little attention. We concede
that one possible outcome if the rule were adopted would be that someone who
is ultimately determined to be free to act in a particular way, without suffering
adverse legal consequences, would be compelled to act in this way by the
issuance of a preliminary injunction and the threat of in terrorem damages if
that injunction is violated. Of course the "taking" in this outcome also has the
possibility of later compensation in the form of reimbursement for compliance
costs at the conclusion of the case.
Quite a different challenge to the preliminary injunction liability rule might
come from those who argue that the parties do not need preliminary injunctions
to provide compensation for nonobligated conduct when they can contract
explicitly for compensation instead. Of course, the fact that the parties were
unable to settle the dispute without seeking assistance from the court suggests
that private bargaining may be too costly or otherwise unavailable to the
parties. When private bargaining fails, the preliminary injunction liability rule
avoids inefficiency while providing compensation.
68
C. Error-Minimizing Rule in Practice
Among our primary goals in this Article is to demonstrate that, in principle,
the Leubsdorf-Posner rule will not induce efficient behavior prior to and during
the course of the litigation. With this specific goal in mind, we have not
considered at length the objections to the Leubsdorf-Posner rule raised by those
who share their view of the objective sought to be accomplished by its
implementation (i.e., minimizing error costs). 69 Two related ideas underlie
these objections: (1) the precise, numerical formulation of the rule unduly
limits the discretion of the judge ruling on the application for a preliminary
injunction, and (2) there is really no feasible way to quantify the variables
implicated by the rules.
We merely note these objections. More interestingly, however, it appears
that for these or other reasons, the courts have in actual practice declined to
68. Indeed, according to Professor Leubsdorf, "[this rule] replicates the settlement of
the preliminary injunction motion that the parties might have reached had not transaction
costs, irrationality, or other factors prevented them. [Additionally, it] transfers the surplus
produced by the more efficient course of action to the party legally entitled to it." Leubsdorf,
supra note 13, at 555. Whether this latter claim is true depends on the type of remedy given
to defendant. If the defeated plaintiff must disgorge all profits earned as a consequence of the
wrongly granted injunction, then the surplus does move to the party with the legal
entitlement. If the remedy is compensation for defendant's compliance costs during the time
between the wrongly granted preliminary injunction and the conclusion of the final hearing,
then the greater part of the surplus will not be transferred to the entitled party.
69. See sources cited supra note 42.
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apply the Leubsdorf-Posner rule. As formulated by Judge Posner, the
comprehensive balancing of expected costs occurs only if plaintiff establishes
both "more than a negligible" chance of succeeding and irreparable injury.
These represent, if you will, plaintiff's prima facie case for preliminary relief.
What the Leubsdorf-Posner rule does, in effect, is provide a means for
presenting defendant's case against preliminary relief. Moreover, both of these
cases are arrayed on the same monetary dimension to determine which case is
stronger.
What actually occurs, however, is that plaintiffs who are denied
preliminary relief are held either to not satisfy the "more than negligible"
standard or to have failed to demonstrate irreparable injury. We have been able
to unearth only one instance in which a plaintiff was denied relief because
defendant's expected costs if the injunction were erroneously granted would
have exceeded plaintiffs expected costs if the injunction were erroneously
denied. And in this instance, the comprehensive balancing was only an
alternative ground of decision.
The single instance in which plaintiff was held to have satisfied the two
preliminary requirements but was denied relief on the basis of the
comprehensive balancing rule occurred in Hendricks Music Co. v. Steinway,
Inc. In that case, Steinway terminated Hendricks as a dealer in accordance
with the distribution agreement between the parties. Hendricks claimed,
however, that the termination violated several sections of the antitrust laws.
The court exhaustively analyzed these claims and concluded that Hendricks had
not satisfied the threshold requirement with respect to its likelihood of success.
Nevertheless, the court proceeded to engage in the comprehensive balancing of
the expected harms to both parties, although it seemed that, given the court's
view that plaintiff had only a very small chance of success, the balancing of
expected harms would inevitably favor defendant. However, the court took
great pains in comparing the irreparable harm that would be suffered by each
party if the preliminary injunction were granted or denied. The court concluded
that, in the particular circumstances of the case, defendant would suffer greater
harm from being unable to terminate plaintiff as a dealer than plaintiff would
suffer from being terminated.
Although it has been cited in hundreds of cases, the Leubsdorf-Posner rule
is not settled law.71 Preliminary injunction decisions are hardly ever based on
the comparison of expected losses in the event of erroneous grants or denials.
We can only speculate why the Leubsdorf-Posner rule is so rarely relied upon
to justify the denial of a request for a preliminary injunction. The opinions offer
little guidance. Perhaps more interestingly for purposes of this Article is that
what the courts do, if not what they say, is very close to what we characterize
as the preliminary injunction liability rule. Once plaintiff makes out her not-
70. 689 F. Supp. 1501 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
71. See supra notes 35 and 42.
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very-demanding prima facie case for the preliminary injunction, defendant is
protected-not by a determination that her expected costs from the injunction
exceed plaintiffs costs from not receiving the injunction, but rather by the
assurance of compensation for compliance costs if she prevails at the
conclusion of the case. Plaintiff makes the decisive choice that determines
whether the preliminary injunction will be granted by deciding whether to
assume contingent liability for defendant's compliance costs and secure the
injunction.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis demonstrates that the difficulty in creating efficient incentives
for behavior occurring prior to the conclusion of litigation results from (1)
uncertainty as to whether plaintiff or defendant is to bear the costs to plaintiff
resulting from defendant's nonperformance and (2) the absence of an effective
right to compensation for a party who performs when not obliged. When these
factors are present and plaintiff is unable to secure a preliminary injunction,
there is a systematic bias toward infringement of entitlements. The traditional
balancing rule for the issuance of preliminary injunctions does not provide a
means for counteracting this bias. If courts followed a rule permitting plaintiff
to secure a preliminary injunction if she were prepared to assume liability for
defendant's compliance costs (if it were ultimately held that defendant was not
obliged to perform) and a rule requiring a finding that performance would be
efficient before granting a preliminary injunction, they could, in principle,
induce efficient behavior.
The choice between the two rules depends on the sum of error and process
costs that would be incurred in implementing the rules. The efficacy of the rule
that freely allows preliminary injunctions depends critically on an accurate (or
at least unbiased) determination of the opportunity costs of performance to
defendant. The efficacy of the rule requiring a finding that performance would
be efficient depends critically on the accuracy of the determination as to
whether defendant or plaintiff values the goods more. Thus, we have arrived at
the now-familiar question whether a liability rule (the free grant of the
injunction subject to liability for defendant's compliance costs) or a property
rule (granting the injunction ifplaintiff values the goods more than defendant)
is the preferable one to adopt.72 We believe that the liability rule is the one that
should be employed. We would, however, constrain its application to only
those situations in which a legitimate dispute as to the proper assignment of the
underlying entitlement can be shown to exist.
72. See Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and
Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 267, 271-77 (2002)
(discussing arguments that have been advanced in favor of property rules and liability rules).
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